World Government &

The City Of London NWO Centre?

Chapter 6 from the book "DESCENT into SLAVERY



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HEN PEOPLE THINK OF ENGLAND such terms as 'Great Britain,' 'The Queen,' 'The Crown,' 'Crown Colonies,' 'London,' The City of London,' and 'British Empire' come to mind and blend together into an indistinguishable blur. They are generally looked upon as synonymous, as being representative of the same basic system. During the 1950's and 1960's the author lived in England (London for five years) without even beginning to realize the vast difference that exists in the meaning of some of the above terms.

When people hear of 'The Crown' they automatically think of the King or Queen; when they hear of 'London' or the 'The City' they instantly think of the capital of England in which the monarch has his or her official residence.

To fully understand the unique and generally unknown subject we must define our terms:

When we speak of 'The City' we are in fact referring to a privately owned Corporation - or Sovereign State - occupying an irregular rectangle of 677 acres and located right in the heart of the 610 square mile 'Greater London' area. The population of 'The City' is listed at just over four thousand, whereas the population of 'Greater London' (32 boroughs) is approximately seven and a half million.

The 'Crown' is a committee of twelve to fourteen men who rule the independent sovereign state known as London or 'The City.'

'The City' is not part of England. It is not subject to the Sovereign. It is not under the rule of the British parliament. Like the Vatican in Rome, it is a separate, independent state. It is the Vatican of the commercial world.

The City, which is often called "the wealthiest square mile on earth," is ruled over by a Lord Mayor. Here are grouped together Britain's great financial and commercial institutions: Wealthy banks, dominated by the privately-owned (Rothschild controlled) Bank of England, Lloyd's of London, the London Stock Exchange, and the offices of most of the leading international trading concerns. [Such as the British Invisibles, I kid you not]. Here, also, is located Fleet Street, the heart and core of the newspaper and publishing worlds.

TWO MONARCHS

The Lord Mayor, who is **elected** for a one year stint, is the monarch in the City. As Aubrey Menen says in "London", Time-Life, 1976, p. 16:

"The relation of this monarch of the City to the monarch of the realm [Queen] is curious and tells much."

It certainly is and certainly does!

When the Queen of England goes to visit the City she is met by the Lord Mayor at Temple Bar, the symbolic gate of the City. She bows and asks for permission to enter his private, sovereign State. During such State visits "the Lord Mayor in his robes and chain, and his entourage in

medieval costume, outshines the royal party, which can dress up no further than service uniforms."

The Lord Mayor leads the queen into his city.

The reason should be clear. The Lord Mayor is the monarch. The Queen is his subject!

The monarch always leads the way. The subject always stays a pace or two behind!

The small clique who rule the City dictate to the British Parliament.

It tells them what to do, and when. In theory Britain is ruled by a Prime Minister and a Cabinet of close advisers. These 'fronts' go to great lengths to create the impression that they are running the show but, in reality, they are mere puppets whose strings are pulled by the shadowy characters who dominate behind the scenes. As the former British Prime Minister of England during the late 1800s Benjamin D'israeli wrote: "So you see... the world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes" (Coningsby, The Century Co., N.Y., 1907, p. 233).

This fact is further demonstrated by another passage from Menen's book: "The Prime Minister, a busy politician, is not expected to understand the mysteries of high finance, while the Chancellor of the Exchequer [Budget Director] is only expected to understand them when he introduces the budget.

Both are advised by the permanent officials of the Treasury, and these listen to the City. If they suspect that some policy of the government will [back-fire]... it is no use their calling up British ambassadors to ask if it is so; they can find out more quickly from the City. As one ambassador complained to me, diplomats are nowadays no more than office boys, and slow ones at that.

"The City will know. They will tell the Treasury and the Treasury will tell the Prime Minister. Woe betide him if he does not listen. The most striking instance of this happened in recent history. In 1956 the then Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden... launched a war to regain the Suez Canal. It had scarcely begun when the City let it be known that in a few days he would have no more money to fight it; the Pound would collapse. He stopped the war and was turned out of office by his party. When the Prime Minister rises to address the Lord Mayor's banquet, he hopes that the City will put more behind him than the gold plate lavishly displayed on the sideboard" (p. 18).

History clearly reveals that the British government is the bond slave of the "invisible and inaudible" force centred in the City. The City calls the tune. The "visible and audible leaders" are mere puppets who dance to that tune on command. They have no power. They have no authority. In spite of all the outward show they are mere pawns in the game being played by the financial elite.

HISTORY of the 'CITY'

From the time of William the Conqueror until the middle of the seventeenth century the British Monarchs ruled supreme - their word was law. They truly were Sovereign in every sense of the word.

As British strength and influence grew around the world toward the end of the 1600's the wealth, strength and influence of the elite merchants in the City also grew - only at a faster pace. In 1694 the privately owned Bank of England (a central bank) was established to finance the profligate ways of William III. The bank was financed by a group of City merchants who used William Paterson as a 'front.' The names of the founders have never been made public.

It was at that juncture that the Bank of England and the City began to dominate and control the affairs of Britain. Their influence and wealth grew in leaps and bounds in the century that followed. "The llustrated Universal History," 1878, records that "Great Britain emerged from her long contest with France with increased power and national glory. Her Empire was greatly expanded in all parts of the world; her supremacy on the sea was undisputed; her wealth and commerce were increased... But with all this national prosperity, the lower classes of the English people were sunk in extreme wretchedness and poverty, having been bled dry during the struggle of the previous twenty years.

It was at this juncture (1815) that the House of Rothschild seized control of the British economy, the Bank of England and the City - and, through their other branches, control of the other European nations.

Prior to this period Britain had developed colonies and outposts in the far-flung reaches of the globe. **Having been thrown out of the Western Hemisphere**, Britain now concentrated on acquiring and developing additional possessions elsewhere.

During its heyday in the nineteenth century approximately 90% of all international trade was carried in British ships. Other shippers had to pay the Crown royalties or commissions for the 'privilege' of doing business on the high seas. During these years 'Britannia Ruled the Waves' through the domination of the most modern and powerful navy known up to that time.

TWO SEPARATE EMPIRES

To avoid misunderstanding, it is important that the reader recognize the fact that **two separate** empires were operating under the guise of the British Empire. One was the Crown Empire and the other was the British Empire.

All the colonial possessions that were white were under the Sovereign - i.e. under the authority of the British government. Such nations as the Union of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Canada were governed under British law. These only represented thirteen percent of the people who made up the inhabitants of the British Empire.

All the other parts of the British Empire - nations like India, Eqypt, Bermuda, Malta, Cyprus and colonies in Central Africa, Sinapore, Hong Kong and Gilbraltar (those areas inhabited by the browns, yellows and blacks) were all Crown Colonies. These were not under British rule. The British parliament had no authority over them. They were privately owned and ruled

by a private club in London, England known as the Crown. The Crown's representative in such areas held the absolute power of life and death over all the people under his jurisdiction.

There were no courts and no method of appeal or retribution against a decision rendered by the representatives of the Crown. Even a British citizen who committed a crime in a Crown colony was subject to the Crown law. He couldn't appeal to British law as it didn't apply.

As the Crown owned the committee known as the British government there was no problem getting the British taxpayer to pay for naval and military forces to maintain the Crown's supremacy in these areas. Any revolts were met with terrible retribution by the British navy at no cost to the Crown.

The City reaped fantastic profits from its operations conducted under the protection of the British armed forces. This wasn't British commerce and British wealth. The international bankers,

prosperous merchants and the British aristocracy who were part of the 'City' machine accumulated vast fortunes which they lavishly squandered in their pursuit of prestige and standing in British Society. Had the wealth been spread out among all the people in the British Isles prosperity would have abounded. [I am not suggesting that this should have been done, the thefts from the exploited should never have occurred to begin with - Ralph].

In spite of the wealth of the world flowing into the City the majority of the British people were barely making ends meet. Many were impoverished to the point of despair. The elite lived in regal splendour.

The poor British peasants were never given a chance to get a cut of the action.

Simon Haxey in "England's Money Lords Tory M.P.," drew his readers' attention to the "total disregard or open contempt displayed by the aristocracy" towards the British people. He also asked, "What part do the colonial people play in the battle for democracy when they themselves have no democratic rights and the British governing class refuses to grant such rights." (pp. 114,115) [we all know the difference between democracy and republics I hope-Ralph]

David Lloyd George, a future prime minister, emphasized the power of the City and its total contempt for the "wretches" who were not part of the 'club.' In a 1910 speech he stated: "We do most of the business of the world. We carry more international trade - probably ten times more - than Germany. Germany carries her own trade largely. The international trade is ours. Well, we do not do it for nothing. As a matter of fact, our shipping brings us over a hundred millions (pounds) a year, mostly paid by that wretched foreigner. I'm taxing the foreigner for all I know... You've heard a good deal of talk here, probably, about the exportation of capital abroad. There is no way in which we can make the foreigner pay more... We get the foreigner in four ways by that. The first way we leave to Lord Rothschild..." ("Better Times", published 1910).

About seventy years ago Vincent Cartwright Vickers stated that "...financiers in reality took upon themselves, perhaps not the responsibility, but certainly the power of controlling the markets of the world and therefore the numerous relationships between one nation and another, involving international friendship and mistrusts... Loans to foreign countries are organized and arranged by the City of London with no thought whatsoever of the nation's welfare but solely in order to increase indebtedness upon which the City thrives and grows rich... This national and mainly international dictatorship of money which plays off one country against another and which, through ownership of a large portion of the press, converts the advertisement of its own private opinion into a semblance of general public opinion, cannot for much longer be permitted to render Democratic Government a mere nickname. Today, we see through a glass darkly; for there is so much which 'it would not be in the public interest to divulge'..." (E.C. Knuth, "Empire of 'The City'", p. 65).

All of the above points were stressed by **Roland G. Usher** on pages 80, 83 and 84 of "Pan Germanism," written in 1913:

"The London and Paris bankers [the international bankers] control the available resources of the world at any one moment, and can therefore practically permit or prevent the undertaking of any enterprise requiring the use of more than a hundred million dollars actual value..."

The international bankers "own probably the major part of the bonded indebtedness of the world.

Russia, Turkey, Egypt, India, China, Japan, and South America are probably owned, so far as any nation can be owned, in London or Paris.

Payment of interest on these vast sums is secured by the pledging of the public revenues of these countries, and, in the case of the weaker nations, by the actual delivery of the perception into the hands of the agents of the English and French bankers. In addition, a very large share, if not the major part, of the stocks and industrial securities of the world are owned by those two nations and the policies of many of the world's enterprises dictated by their financial heads. The world itself, in fact, pays them tribute; it actually rises in the morning to earn its living by utilizing their capital, and occupies its days in making them still wealthier."

In 1946 E.C. Knuth wrote:

"The bulwark of the British financial oligarchy lies in its ageless and self-perpetuating nature, its long-range planning and prescience, its facility to outwait and break the patience of its opponents. The transient and temporal statesmen of Europe and particularly of Britain itself, who have attempted to curb this monstrosity, have all been defeated by their limited tenure of confidence. Obligated to show action and results in a too short span of years, they have been outwitted and out waited, deluged with irritants and difficulties; eventually obliged to temporise and retreat. There are few who have opposed them in Britain and America, without coming to a disgraceful end, but many, who served them well, have also profited well" ("Empire of 'The City," p. 65).

END of CHAPTER 6 from the book "DESCENT into SLAVERY", by Des Griffin

You have just completed reading the sixth chapter of ""DESCENT into SLAVERY", by Des Griffin.

To see a television series somewhat based on "The City", rent or buy videos of the cult classic 60's Brit. TV series, " **The Prisoner**". (Patrick McGoohan stars in this mini-series as a British intelligence agent who angrily resigns, is kidnapped by persons unknown, and ends up in "The Village" where he is constantly prodded by his Orwellian captors to provide "information.")

NOTE FROM BOB: IN THIS INTERVIEW BELOW YOU WILL SEE THE MIND OF THE LIBERAL WHITE FOOL EXPOSED WITH ALL IT'S UTTER MINDLESS BLATHER. THIS IS A MAN WHO HAS BEEN COMPLETELY BRAINWASHED BY THE JEWS.

DE'KLERK WILL SURELY GO DOWN IN "REAL" HISTORY AS THE BIGGEST ASS AND UTTER TRAITOR WHO EVER DESTROYED HIS OWN COUNTRY.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/7114/hbo history makers series.html

HBO History Makers Series: Frederik Willem de Klerk ; Authors: Frederick De Klerk Richard Stengel, June 8, 2004 - Council on Foreign Relations

Speaker: Frederik Willem de Klerk, former president of the Republic of South Africa Moderator: Richard Stengel, president & CEO, National Constitution Center, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y., June 8, 2004

RICHARD STENGEL: [In progress] –and I'm here today in part because I worked with Nelson Mandela on his autobiography. And I want to welcome you all to the Council's "History Makers" series, sponsored by HBO.

And we are very, very fortunate to have President F.W. De Klerk here today. He is a former president of the Republic of South Africa, a co-winner with Nelson Mandela of the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize, and the man who initiated a seminal, earth-shattering change in South Africa. After the election of 1994, he briefly served in the government of national unity [the government

formed in 1994 comprising the African National Congress (ANC), the National Party—headed by de Klerk— and the Inkatha Freedom Party]. Then the National Party left that government, and he basically left politics. He has created a new foundation called the Global Leadership Foundation, which he will talk about a little bit today. And we're just very fortunate to have him because he was at a critical hinge in 20th century history. History made the man, and the man made history. Welcome, F.W. De Klerk. [Applause.]

Now before I ask the first questions, there are a few ground rules.

And they are: the interview is on the record, as you know. Cell phones have to be turned off. No one should leave early, before the Q&A is over. We'll go to questions from the audience in about 25 minutes, and you should stand up, grab the microphone, state your name and identification. And this is also [to] be teleconferenced, I'm told, so there may be perhaps some questions from not even in this room.

So let me start out, to go back to a very dramatic moment in time, the 2nd of February, 1990. You'd been president less than a year. You gave that extraordinary speech [repudiating apartheid] in which the whole world was watching. You unbanned the ANC. You talked about the release of Nelson Mandela. You ended, for the most part, petty apartheid. If you take your mind back to that day and you look at South Africa today in 2004, is this what you envisioned? Did the country turn out the way you thought it would when you made those changes in 1990?

F.W. DE KLERK: My answer to that would be, by and large, yes. There are a number of imperfections in the new South Africa where I would have hoped that things would be better, but on balance I think we have basically achieved what we set out to achieve. And if I were to draw balance sheets on where South Africa stands now, I would say that the positive outweighs the negative by far.

There is a tendency by commentators across the world to focus on the few negatives which are quite negative, like how are we handling AIDS, like our role vis-a-vis Zimbabwe. But the positives— the stability in South Africa, the adherence to well-balanced economic policies, fighting inflation, doing all the right things in order to lay the basis and the foundation for sustained economic growth— it's in place. The constitutional certainty, the adherence to the constitution, but most important of all, what is in place is an underlying goodwill between all the people of South Africa, a sort of a commitment to make the new South Africa work, to take each other's hands and in an optimistic way to reach out to the future and [see that] we can become a winning country. I think this characterizes the spirit of South Africa, and I couldn't have hoped for more.

STENGEL: The nature of these conversations is to look backward and forward. And to look backward for a second again, that was an extraordinary time. Shortly after you became president [in September 1989], the Berlin Wall fell. **I'm curious how the fall of communism affected your calculations** about changing the dispensation in South Africa. How critical was that?

DE KLERK: It was of very, very critical importance to me. Fact is that until the Berlin Wall came down, we were facing in South Africa a very real military and political threat from the U.S.S.R. They had a strategy, and it wasn't dreamed up by the National Party or by my predecessor, [President] P.W. Botha.

They had a strategy of really directly or indirectly gaining control over the whole of southern Africa with its mineral riches, with its strategic position. We had to face in the decade or so before I could take the initiatives that I took: hundreds of thousands of Cuban troops in southern Africa, Russian pilots involved in the war in Angola. So there was a very real strategy amongst some from the communist bloc to gain control over southern Africa.

And the ANC, being an organization of South Africans asking for full political rights but being in close alliance—getting all their money, all their weapons, all their training, everything from the U.S.S.R.--posed part of that threat. When the Berlin Wall came down, when communism imploded and lost its sting, sudden ly the ANC was an organization of South Africans saying, "We want full political rights," something which I and my party have already decided they should have, and we could negotiate with them. We were not negotiating then with an extension of a world power with expansionist policies, but we were negotiating with a group of South Africans representing, as we already then realized, the majority of all black South Africans to work out a peaceful transition and a peaceful future and a new democracy.

It offered a window of opportunity. And the lesson we've learned is that leadership is about seeing the window of opportunity when it opens up and using it, because quite often it closes down. If I look at some other situations in the rest of the world at the moment, then unfortunately one has to say that some windows of opportunities have been missed by the leadership in some of the trouble spots and they've closed down, and therefore the situation is deteriorating instead of improving.

STENGEL: In your autobiography, "<u>The Last Trek</u>", I believe it's called, you talk about the economic implications of excluding the majority of the population of South Africa. And to skip from talking about communism to talking about capitalism, how did that factor into your calculation, that basically the economics of apartheid couldn't really continu

DE KLERK: Well, if you ask me why apartheid failed, let's start at that point.

STENGEL: Okay.

DE KLERK: If we go back, what did I support when I was a young man? I supported what the whole world now supports for Israel and Palestine as the right— as the correct solution: partitioning, creating nation states on an ethnic basis < /SPAN>, and getting those ethnic states, in our case, to work together in some sort of confederation, something like the European Union, a Southern African union.

It failed. Why did it fail? It failed for demographic reasons. More and more, people were not living in the parts of South Africa historically where they came from, but they were becoming more and more cosmopolitan in our cities, where the job opportunities were being created. It failed because the more we wanted to separate, the more economically integrated and interdependent we became. It failed because my old party, the National Party, wanted to retain too much land. It wasn't imaginative and creative enough in saying if we want to build nation-states, we have to make bigger sacrifices.

It failed. And we reached the stage where we had to admit to ourselves that we had failed to bring justice to the majority of all South Africans through the route of building a little Europe there, through the nation-state route, and that we have reached the point of no return. It was failure. We could either cling to power, more and more moving into a situation where we are, with our military might, protecting an unjust society— or we could make a quantum leap and say we were wrong and make an apology and say— but we're not only going to say, "We're sorry, we apologize, we failed to bring to justice," but take an initiative to really change things and to really bring about a just society, offering full opportunity to everybody and full and equal rights to everybody, within the framework of tolerance, because of our **diversity**.

I wonder whether people realize that we have 11 official languages in South Africa, none of which can be spoken, is understood, or can be read by all South Africans. We are really a little Europe, but a Europe with no borders, a Europe where we all share a common destiny, where we have to build a nation. And the challenge is to build that nation, to identify that which brings us

together, without destroying the building blocks, because once you start making different—each of the 11 language groups feeling unsure of themselves, at that moment, you start to sow the seeds again of new dissension, new tensions, new fears, and therefore also conflicting aspirations.

This is our challenge. Economically speaking, we need each other. We've one economy. On a day-to-day basis, notwithstanding the efforts to enforce segregation, we move closer and closer. And may I close this answer by saying, in that sense, sanctions was a failure vis-a-vis South Africa.

STENGEL: Talk some more about sanctions, because I know you feel that they were not successful, and I know Nelson Mandela feels that they were not successful. Americans tend to, I think, overestimate the power and importance of sanctions.

DE KLERK: Yeah. I fully agree with that statement. Sanctions, in our case, succeeded in twisting our economy, in making us channel funds into ventures which were basically uneconomical. But we have bypassed sanctions very, very successfully.

When I was a young minister of mineral and energy affairs—I don't know why I'd been made it, because I'm a lawyer by training—but I had about one-third of all the portfolios you could have in South Africa. We had enough oil bunkered in old mines, et cetera, coupled with our new oil from gold project, which was initiated by sanctions. And the fate of sanctions: to last four years on end without bringing in one new drop of oil into South Africa. Later on we sold off the oil which we bought at cheap prices at profits—[laughter]--and we could use the funds raised for good purposes. Sanctions, yes, twisted our economy, but in the end it hurt the people it was intended to help.

In the end, it didn't make us change. If you were to ask me what was the driving force in the '80s which could bring me to the point of making a 180-degree turn, of taking the quantum leap which I took, it was inner conviction that we can only build the future on the basis of justice to all, that we have failed to bring justice, that we were in the wrong road, that we were in a cul-de-sac which could only end into spiraling violence, into a downward spiral of conflict which would end in a sort of an Armageddon, a catastrophe. And we stepped back from that precipice.

Sanctions kept us on our toes. I'm not saying it didn't have any influence whatsoever. But at times it was used so effectively, by, for instance, John Vorster, a former prime minister, to foster support. He won the biggest National Party election ever on the basis of an anti-American platform of, "Who the hell are they to tell us what to do?" [Laughter.]

STENGEL: Now, speaking of your quantum leap, not everybody, of course, wanted you to make such a leap. And after that speech in 1990 there were great spasms of violence. The talks between you and the ANC kept coming undone; it was a very unsteady road. There are those, including in <u>Allister Sparks' most recent book</u>, who believed that the country was very close to a military coup between then and the election in '94. Is that the case?

DE KLERK: I never felt that there was a real risk of a military coup. I think we succeeded all along to keep the top brass— in the military, in the police, and so on— supportive of drastic reform and initiatives. There was a sa ying in the military circles that when we were sort of in a corner in the middle '80s, when there was escalating violence, that the solution would be 30 percent military and 70 percent political. There was a risk of the far white right, which would have included some of the reserve forces, people not full-time in the military, not full-time in the police, but having been trained and doing service so many— a month every year, or that sort of thing— could have been drafted, and they were led by a former chief of the defense force. But in the end, three months before the [1994] election— two months,

actually, befo re the election— the ANC, President Mandela took some initiatives to interact with them and convince them to come aboard, and with General Constand Viljoen [former chief of the South African Defense Force and founder of the Freedom Front Party] coming aboard and saying, "Okay, we will participate in the election," it diffused that threat. But I don't agree with Allister Sparks that at any time we were very near to a real military coup. None of the information that I got as president ever tended to indicate that that was a real threat. It's an overstatement, I think.

STENGEL: I do remember when **Mandela** reached out to General Viljoen, and it was quite extraordinary. Now you served with him [Mandela] in a government of national unity. You have a very complex and complicated history with him th rough private negotiations, which you talk about in your book. I was wondering if you would for us evaluate his strengths and weaknesses as a leader. What, on the one hand, makes him extraordinary? On the other hand, what are the flaws and foibles he might have?

DE KLERK: Well, let me start by saying that all icons also have feet of clay. He doesn't have much clay in his feet. He's really a big man. He has a dignity and a clarity of mind which I greatly admire.

His greatest contribution to South Africa was in the field— and is still in the field of reconciliation. The remarkable lack of bitterness that this man has shown is an example, I think, for anybody who has made sacrifices for a cause in which they believe. He's a great communicator. He was never a good administrator. He wasn't a hands-on president at all. Right from the beginning, he never chaired the Cabinet. I was, for two years, together with [current President] Thabo Mbeki, executive deputy president. We chaired the Cabinet on a rotational basis. He was there, he attended all Cabinet meetings, but he more or less based his presidency on the French system. He chose just a few issues on which to concentrate, and he left the running of the government and the day to day things to the deputy presidents and to his Cabinet ministers and so on. So he didn't shine as an administrator, but he's shone as a uniting figure, cementing a tenuous, very fragile new unity within South Africa. Having been put at the top, I played a supporting role after 1994 of a new unity bringing together former enemies which were shooting at each other, which were undermining each other, which were at war with each other. I think he did a marvelous job on that.

Our fights that you refer to, our tensions, which were quite severe at times during my presidency especially, centered around, both from his side and my side, some people within our institutions and systems acting against our orders and policies, continuing undercover activities which were actually totally in conflict with the policies which we were trying to advance and the agreements which we were trying to reach. So in the end, evidence was uncovered that there were elements in the security forces who were sabotaging the very things I was trying to achieve and I was busy negotiating.

But likewise— and this is not given, maybe, enough coverage by history writers— there were elements in the ANC who were acting in conflict with what, under Mandela's leadership, the ANC was committing itself to. There is the one incident which has become public, Operation Vula, [in 1998-90], [the ANC] kept bringing in AK-47s [assault rifles] and they were still involved in some underground activities which were actually militating against what was happening in South Africa.

But Mandela is a great man and he deserves the place of honor he has in the world and in South Africa.

STENGEL: You mention him as a figure of reconciliation, and I'm put in mind, of course, of the <u>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</u>. Do you feel that has been a force for good in South Africa? I know you have been criticized and have been critical of it.

DE KLERK: Well, I've been a successful litigant on twice occasions— on two occasions against them, and— because they were definitely one-sided. Firstly, the basic fault line with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was their composition. It wasn't in any way representative of the conflicts of the past. It was one-sided. When it was formed, I was deputy president. In terms of the constitution, President Mandela had to negotiate— had to consult with me before appointing the commission. I and my party supported the need for such a commission all the time. And then he sent me a list of names. And I went to him and I said, "But I can't support this list of names. Can't we— we did a lot of research, can't we replace the following four names with these four? Then we will have a more well-balanced commission." And for once he was not prepared to negotiate. He said, "No, this is the commission I want, and if you want to take off names, then I will want to take off other names. This is what I want to appoint." And in the end, I said, "Then appoint it, but it's your commission; it's not a consensus commission."

And from the beginning, from what I represent in South Africa, the commission, in its composition, was flawed. This permeated through in the choice of priorities. In the end—let me just state one fact, not spending too much time on it. In the end, they never investigated [Inkatha Freedom Party leader Dr. Mangosuthu] Buthelezi's complaint [that] about 400 of these top, top people in the Inkatha Freedom Party, in the Inkatha freedom movement, who had been assassinated in cold blood. There's nothing in the report about who done it, how did it occur or anything. So— on the negative side.

But on the positive side, the Truth Commission, I think, played a crucial role on the central issue, which is an issue for every country coming out of conflict, and that is the question of amnesty—the question of applying a reasonably formulated legislative provision to say who qualifies for amnesty, which crimes were political in nature and therefore qualifies for amnesty, and which crimes do not. And they played a crucial role in that.

They played a crucial role, I think, in convincing many people to uncover, to bring to the—forth the truth about certain incidents, which help family of victims, people who just simply disappeared, to know what happened to their loved ones. And there were some emotional scenes where people who coldbloodedly murdered opponents on the other side became sort of reunited with the families of those people, and forgiveness came to the fore. So also in the emotional sphere, I think the Truth Commission made a good contribution.

But in their own report they say—because they were not just the Truth Commission; they were the Truth and Reconciliation Commission—they admitted that they did not really get to the point of successfully promoting reconciliation and expressed the hope that, on the basis of the truths which have been uncovered, the painful truths, that others would take and continue with initiatives to strengthen reconc iliation and to continue on the road of reconciliation. And this is actually what Mandela, what I'm trying to do, what many other people in South Africa are trying to do, and that is to say we must keep the concept of the need for reconciliation, for forgiveness, for cooperation alive. That is what the <u>F.W. De Klerk Foundation</u> in South Africa is about. We promote an active civil society to be on the playing field and to be part of nurturing the young and tender plant of the new South Africa.

STENGEL: I'm going to ask one more question and then we will go out to all of you for questions. My last question is, to just bring us up to the present day, can you give us a report card on Thabo Mbeki's administration? How has he done?

DE KLERK: Firstly, one must realize that in a sense Thabo Mbeki has been, in European terms, almost the prime minister since 1994. Because of what I said, that Nelson Mandela wasn't a hands-on president, Thabo Mbeki, with my assistance initially and thereafter on his own, was really running the day-to-day government of the country.

The big breakthrough which I think all of us must understand which has been made in South Africa is that the ANC, with its too strong democratic base. It's not healthy in any democracy to have two-thirds or more of the vote comes from a far-left, hard-line socialist background. They've been for many, many decades in close alliance to the South African Communist Party. And that party, as part of the tran sition, as part of the constitutional transition in South Africa, has decided to adopt free market principles. They moved from nationalization to privatization, and they are holding the line on well-balanced economic policies, growth-oriented economic and financial forward planning: fighting inflation, containing the money supply, really doing all the right things in order to instill investors' confidence. And initially I think amongst investors there was skepticism. So on the economic side, I give them very high marks.

On the stability side and with regard to a few other important governance aspects, I think we went through a phase of trying to reinvent the wheel. There were good policies in place but, somehow or another, the new administration didn't want to be seen to take over policies from my administration and from the National Party government. Somehow or another they wanted to give it a new name. And from that was born the Reconstruction and Development Plan [which aimed to rectify imbalances in South African society created by the apartheid government] with new names, with new terminology. But in the end, we all united in the need to win the war against poverty.

So also, on the social side, within the framework of restraints and with making allowance for adaptation time, I think we're doing quite well in trying to improve the quality of life, in helping the poorest of the poor, in bringing electricity to those who didn't have it. But we have some failures as well.

Thus far, we have not succeeded— and I was involved the last five years before I became president, as minister of National Education— in really, while spending one-fifth, 20 percent, of our total budget on education, in really making that money work to the best effect in the sense of putting it to the best use in upgrading the quality of education for everybody instead of having very good education for som e and just, really, the minimum— crisis management, all the rest.

I think we're beginning to win the war against crime. Once again, we lost some time. But things are improving.

The big criticism is on AIDS. We lost a lot of time. When I handed over in '94, we had some good AIDS plans prepared by a former minister of health under me. It was shelved originally. A lot of time was lost. And then there was this destructive argument about whether HIV caused AIDS. And I think President Mbeki was ill-advised on this. In the end, civil society asserted itself. And with the help of Mandela, with the help of [Bishop Desmond] Tutu, with the help of me, with the help of some civil society organizations, finally, the government has almost been forced into beginning to do what should have been done some time ago. So I give them very bad marks on handling that.

Another issue for which the Mbeki government is— and I'm not an advocate for them; I didn't vote for them— but for which they are being hammered across the world is the Zimbabwe situation [a reference to the upheaval caused by controversial policies of President Robert Mugabe]. There I have more sympathy. What should we do? Isn't the world expecting too much from us vis-à-vis Zimbabwe? Should we send in our army? Should we make Zimbabwe South Africa's Iraq? I don't think so, because if we really put on a scale the worst countries in Africa, terribly bad as it is, Zimbabwe isn't the worst. Should we strangle them economically? We can. We could close Beitbridge [Zimbabwean city on South African border], because we really control their lifeblood inasmuch as they have to get things out of Zimbabwe or get things into Zimbabwe. We will just make the people who are already hungry die of hunger. We won't hurt Mugabe and his cronies.

So the only really responsible alternative is pressure, and there I'm critical. I think there was too much velvet in the glove so far and too little iron in the fist so far. And I think President Mbeki should, at a much earlier stage, have said, "This will never happen in South Africa." I share with you it will never happen in South Africa. It's a totally different situation. But it has harmed South Africa, it has harmed southern Africa, and just maybe vocally, more should have been done and more should have been said.

STENGEL: Let me cut you off here. And you've covered a lot of the bases that people will probably ask about, so let's throw it open to questions. Right here. And identify yourself and your affiliation.

QUESTIONER: My name is **Lucy Komisar**. I'm a journalist. I'm asking this question on behalf of Africa Confidential, which is a newsletter published in London. My question is about two situations in the present that are rooted in t he past. First, how do you feel about the collapse of the National Party? And second, how do you feel about the fact that ex-South Africa special forces soldiers, in companies such as Erinsys, which is known as [Iraqi politician Ahmed] Chalabi's private army in Iraq, are going around the world trouble spots and being involved in attempts at destabilization and human rights abuses?

DE KLERK: Well, let me start with the last question by saying I supported the law which said that it is unlawful for South Africans to be involved as hired soldiers, or— what's the right English terminology?

STENGEL: Mercenaries.

DE KLERK: As mercenaries. So I think it's bad for the image of South Africa. I think it's part of an international problem. I'm sure that these private armies are not made up just out of South Africans. But if it's wrong for South Africans, it's also wrong for ex-British SAS [Special Air Service] people and for people from past forces across the world. It's a tragic state of affairs internationally that there is a market for people with these skills. I'm against it. But I think the medium and long-term solution lies in addressing the root causes for the conflict and not in increasing the military capacity or the fighting capacity or the killing capacity or the murdering capacity of conflicting parties.

And therefore, our attention should be focused on winning the war against poverty, on bringing better health conditions and better education to people, because it's on those grievances that extremists, whether it's extremists religiously speaking, or extremists from— for whatever cause, they rely on the grievances. That is where they gather their support from. And if those grievances can— while we attend to suppressing the violence, if those grievances can in a creative manner be serviced and if moderate people can get the support from international sources in order to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the extremists, then I think we will begin to make progress.

On the question of the National Party, obviously my heart is sore. I grew up in that party. My father [former Senator Jan de Klerk] was a minister under three consecutive prime ministers. I played a crucial role— not the only role; many others played crucial roles with me— in transforming an apartheid party to a visionary party, to a party which took an initiative. Without that initiative, South Africa w ould not have been what it is today. I'm proud of the National Party as it was in the early 1990s. So its almost-demise is, on a personal basis, a tragedy.

I continue to believe that in a complex country like South Africa, coming out of decades of conflict and centuries of injustice, you need a cooperative, consensus-seeking model. That typical confrontational democracy—like we have in Great Britain, like we have here in the United States— is not the right recipe for us. We need to take hands. We need to lift the big challenges w hich we face— unemployment, poverty, the health situation, crime— out of

the political arena, and we need to cooperate. In that sense, the National Party's total failure in the past election can be attributed, to a certain extent, to the fact that they said, "We stand for this," whereas many voters felt, "No, we want a robust opposition which takes the government by its shirtfront, which shakes it about, and which voiced our fears, instead of which works for solutions."

So maybe the National Party was ahead of its time. I hope that it will retain its identity, and I think that maybe the only viable alternative for it is what it is considering at the moment, and that is to say we will retain our identity. But we will work together with the ANC and we will try to find a formula as to how we can be accommodated in such a close cooperation relationship.

STENGEL: Right here.

QUESTIONER: [In Afrikaans.]

DE KLERK: [Responds in Afrikaans.]

QUESTIONER: My Afrikaans stops right there! [Laughter.] My name is Joe Hurd and I'm with the Katama Group, a consulting firm in Washington. And as you may know, there is a South African trade delegation in the United States this week to echo all of the positives you said about the South African economy—20 consecutive quarters of growth, net exporter of Mercedes-Benz automobiles, and so on.

My question is on Black Economic Empowerment [BEE] transactions [a program created under the Reconstruction and Development Plan]. And despite all the positives in South Africa at the moment, there still is a sense in the U.S.-European investment community that these BEE deals are fraught with risk. I was wondering whether you had any words for the investment community here in the United States about those transactions and the current spate of deal-making in South Africa.

DE KLERK: Black Economic Empowerment is something which keeps our minds very busy at the moment. It needs to take place. We've written affirmative action into our constitution. Our constitution says there shall not be discrimination on the basis of race or color or any other reason—sex, or whatever. But for the sake of rectifying the injustices of the past, there shall be affirmative action. And these two concepts must be kept in balance with each other; not to fall back into a pattern of racial discrimination, but at the same time, distinguishing between sort of bad racial discrimination and necessary racial differentiation for some time in order to address the injustices of the past.

It is the cause of great debates and of great uncertainty. It's causing an outflow of young white, colored and Indian South Africans, which we really can't afford. But fortunately, the pendulum is swinging; many of them are coming home. As the rand has strengthened against the pound and the dollar, suddenly it's n ot so lucrative to be elsewhere, and they're beginning to come back, and they look for the nice climate, and it is: "We have such a wonderful country." [Laughter.]

So I'm not so overly concerned. And it's good that youngsters get new horizons and wider experience and then come back as people with better insight into life, maybe. So I don't think it's such a crisis as some people make it out.

I think black empowerment runs the risk of enriching too few, instead of bringing a better life to the masses. And I think there's a risk in South Africa of a backlash amongst the black masses against a new class of highly successful black entrepreneurs. And I think all of us, not

just government, civil society mu st be careful to ensure that this risk doesn't develop into a real threat to sort of stability and good relations in South Africa.

But black empowerment is necessary. Can I testify, as an Afrikaner, from early history? With the Great Depression in 1933, after having lost the Anglo-Boer War a hundred years ago against the British, taking our freedom and our self-determination away from us in two republics, they suddenly developed this great conscience when we discovered gold and diamonds in certain areas. I'm not anti-British, but t hat's – [laughter]--that's the—those are the historical facts. [Laughter.]

My people were very poor, and the economy, the wealth, was really in the hands of the English business community in South Africa. And they, in the middle '30s, reached out and said, "We must create a mining house next to the three, four big mining houses controlling the gold, controlling the diamonds, controlling the platinum, to empower the white Afrikaners." And thus General Mining [and Finance Corporation, later called Gencor] was born, from which really Billiton [PLC, which Gencor purchased in 1994 to be its offshore investment subsidiary,] has grown. It was a wise step.

And in many other spheres there was this acknowledgement of the need to build a middle class and to build a managerial class also amongst people who come from an agrarian background, more in agriculture, more "plaatsland," you know, rural.

So I support Black Economic Empowerment. I think, however, it must be done in such a way that it doesn't deteriorate into a new form of apartheid, where there is racial discrimination again purely on the basis of color, and that we must continue to work very hard at finding and maintaining a formula which balances merit, experience and the need of doing something about the injustices of the past in the pr oper balance to the best interests of all South Africans.

STENGEL: We have about 10 minutes left. So let's do final questions— to use an American television term, a lightning round. Short questions, short answers.

DE KLERK: I'm a bit long on my answers, I know. [Laughter.]

STENGEL: My old friend, Tom Karis.

QUESTIONER: City University. One of the major changes of the new South Africa is the establishment of a constitutional court. Like the American Supreme Court, it has the power to judge the constitutionality of the legislative and the executive. But unlike the American constitutional court, unlike the American Supreme Court, it has a mandate to be an agent of transformation toward equality. What is your evaluation of the record of the court? And how independent has it been, including independent of the ANC?

MR. DE KLERK: I think one of the most profound changes is the fact that we moved from a situation which we have in Britain, where with a majority of one any law can be made, to a constitution which contains a values system, which contains certain immutable principles, with a mechanism—namely the constitutional court—t o uphold that values system. Thus far, the constitutional court has done quite well. Regionally there were fears, just looking at the political background of those on the constitutional court, that it might allow itself to be politicized. It has shown courage and independence by overruling government and overruling Parliament on certain basic principles.

I do think we have given them a difficult task by also charging them to promote transformation, but I'm happy in my mind that they're doing a good job and that they are upholding an independent view according to true juridical principles.

I'm proud of our constitutional court, and I think they're doing well— to the point that one of the projects which I have for my foundation in South Africa is I would like to establish a watchdog organization which can make better use of the constitutional court. I don't think South Africans are claiming their constitutional rights effectively. It's too expensive to go to them, and we need sort of an assisting organization to sometimes take an initiative in order to put flesh on the skeleton which is contained in our bill of rights.

STENGEL: Yes, sir. You've been waiting a long time.

QUESTIONER: Mahesh Kotecha, Structured Credit International. My question, sir, is about the leadership that South Africa can exercise and has exercised in African affairs. That part is an initiative that was started, among others, by South Africa. And there's a [Group of Eight] meeting going on, as you know, in South— in Sea Island, where African leaders, six African leaders will be present, including So uth Africa's. I wondered if you could give some short assessment of NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa's Development], particularly in its political dimension of providing greater governance. You referred to Zimbabwe already, where it has really failed to have any effect.

DE KLERK: I'm a great supporter of NEPAD. I think South Africa is destined to play a pivotal role in especially sub-Sahara Africa, in southern Africa, but on the whole continent of Africa. I think we are very conscious of the fact that we have to avoid trying to be seen to be big brother who tries to prescribe with all humility, and I'm not critical. I have great sympathy with America. It's very— it's very tough to be the only remaining superpower in the world. I mean, in that sense, it's very tough for us in South Africa to be on the African continent, really, to be seen as really maybe the most successful, and maybe the most powerful country. In that sense of the word, we are trying to promote the concept of partnership between us and other leading countries. And that is why you'll find five or six presidents trying to promote NEPAD.

I would have liked to see NEPAD start as the European Union started, as a club of countries already complying with certain minimum requirements, and then saying, "You can become members of NEPAD as you make progress on democratization, on creating a human rights culture, on following well-balanced economic policies." I think it was a mistake to say, "All members of the African Union are part of NEPAD," be ecause immediately it puts the failures at the top instead of having the example to be followed, model which was built into the original European Union.

But that's water under the bridge. The leading countries of the world need to take hands with the leading countries in Africa in order to build a partnership and to devise ways and means of reaching out to the drowning countries in the developing world and, in this case, the drowning countries in Africa. The free world c an't afford to turn its back on a continent sliding further and further back. [Crosstalk - inaudible.]

QUESTIONER: Mr. de Klerk, Prudence Solomon, president of South African Tours in America. Sir, your thoughts on Mr. [Jean Bertrande] Aristide [deposed president of Haiti] being given asylum in South Africa?

DE KLERK: I have reason to believe that America would have liked us to accept him sooner than we did. [Laughter.] Good reason, by the way, to believe that. So I don't think we're offending the rest of the world by doing so. I wouldn't like us to become a receptacle for rejected leaders and undemocratic leaders and so on, but from time to time I think countries have to play a role. So for me, it's not high on my agenda. I'm not unduly concerned, as long as we don't spend too much taxpayers' money on him.

STENGEL: Okay. This gentleman back there. You've been waiting a while.

QUESTIONER: Mr. President, Tomas Amorim with the **Council on Foreign Relations**. I just would love to hear your thoughts on the new strategic partnership between South Africa, Brazil, and India, which the president of Brazil also hopes to expand to include China and Russia; the potential effectiveness of such a trade and strategic alliance.

STENGEL: This has to be really short – [laughter]--and then one more question, then—

DE KLERK: I think if it's good for the strong countries of the world to have strategic relationships, it's good also for the middle-sized countries to develop a sort of a consensus and to represent the interests of the billions of people living in their countries, struggling to also gain more from the advantages of globalization and standing sort of with one foot in poverty and one foot in development. We're the hybrid countries of the world, and I think it's good if we get organized a bit and organize ourselves in order to advance common purposes. I think it will also help the leading countries of the world—America and so on—if we can prevent further Cancuns [the World Trade Organization's ministerial conference in Cancun in 2003 where participants failed to agree on new trade rules] and the like by representing a moderate view from the developing world rather than allowing the extremists and the radicals to take charge of the debate.

STENGEL: So I want to have one more question. And I'll call on you, Frank, but before I do I want to give you a little bit of time at the end to talk about the **Global Leadership Foundation**, mindful of the fact that we're almost done. I'm sorry? Oh yes, okay. And there— okay.

DE KLERK: Ah. What is at the door? Ah, okay. So we won't talk about that. You'll get some documentation for those of you who want. I will say two sentences.

QUESTIONER: Frank Ferrari of ProVentures. Mr. De Klerk, may I go back to the beginning, when you talked about reconciliation? And I personally think, and I'm sure others, that the contribution of South Africa today in this torn world is remarkably outstanding. But in that context, a hundred Afrikaners recently adopted a statement in support of Thabo Mbeki on one hand, but on the other hand in parliament, the opposition as seen by the majority is almost exclusively white in terms of the challenges that oppose the government and the questions that are asked. It's a white opposition. Are you concerned about that as a threat, in the eyes of the majority as a threat to reconciliation?

DE KLERK: In a sense, almost all parties have become nonracial parties. I'm very proud that in '94, my party, who used to be the apartheid party, had more than 50 percent of our vote— of 4 million votes, more than 50 percent came from people of color and less than 50 percent from whites. **Unfortunately things have det eriorated**, and **I would say that our politics is still much too much ethnically based** and ethnically dominated **instead of us being brought together around values, the same beliefs, the same policies**.

And I believe there will be a realignment in South African politics, breaking out of the historical ethnic patterns to value-based politics where those right of center in their political thinking, in their economic thinking, will find ways and means to cooperate irrespective of race or color. Those left of center—and I'm convinced that we will [inaudible] when that realignment comes because it's going to come. The ANC is going to split somewhere along the line. The cement which kept them together, namely, to end apartheid, has gone. Apartheid is gone. And you can't continue to have communists, and hard-line socialists, and pragmatists, and free-market people in the same party; there isn't cement. There has got to be a realignment. And I'm sure when that comes, there will be a coalition of the center—left of center, right of center— and we will successfully marginalize radicals to the left and radicals to the right.

But at the moment, our democracy is not very healthy; it's too much racially dominated, and it is too much unbalanced. If the second-biggest party in the country doesn't have 10 percent of the vote, then you don't have a healthy democracy.

STENGEL: Now, two sentences on the Global Leadership Foundation.

DE KLERK: The Global Leadership Foundation is a new initiative into which I've been dragged in a sense by a friend. I had enough on my plate. It's a new initiative where I've brought together a group of retired leaders—presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers—who are no longer seeking the limelight, who are prepared to give some of their time to offer quiet and confidential advice to people in government, especially in the developing world, with no political agenda of their own, with no profit-making motive at all—just to be there on specific issues to provide confidential advice, helping leaders to take courageous decisions which can take their countries forward. That is the smallest nutshell in which I can put it. [Laughter.]

STENGEL: [Chuckles.] Okay. Very good.

DE KLERK: I can impress you with the list of names. Unfortunately, some former politicians are too fond of the limelight, and although they're highly competent, I didn't invite them to become part. [Laughter.]

STENGEL: There are some fliers about the foundation that you get on the way out. I want to thank Mr. de Klerk for participating in our HBO History Makers series. You yourself, sir, are an international icon who does not have feet of clay and saw further than your contemporaries. Thank you very much for being here. [Applause.]

DE KLERK: Thank you very much.

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Subject: Fwd: RSA'S DRAMATIC SKILLS LOSS AND GOVERNMENT DOUBLE TALK

From: TAU SA Sent: Tuesday, May 02, 2006 10:43 AM

Subject: SA'S DRAMATIC SKILLS LOSS AND GOVERNMENT DOUBLE TALK

SOUTH AFRICA BULLETIN from the headquarters of

TAU SA in Pretoria Web: www.tlu.co.za

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E-mail: info@tlu.co.za May 2, 2006

The Bulletin attached hereto is provided as a means to inform stakeholders of **agricultural developments in South Africa**. These Bulletins are distributed every two weeks and could also be found on TAU SA's website at www.tlu.co.za.

TAU SA is the oldest agricultural union in South Africa and has been in existence since 1897. The mission of the union is to ensure a productive and safe existence of its members on the land they own. Current reality in South Africa indicates that this is not possible at the moment due to a variety of actions and threats against commercial farmers.

SA'S DRAMATIC SKILLS LOSS AND GOVERNMENT DOUBLE TALK

Press reports of late show the South African government on a "shopping spree"- as one journalist put it - for skilled people. The government is "aggressively" hiring health care officials as it moves to plug the brain drain of qualified health care personnel, says Health Department press releases. There has to be a "skills revolution" proclaimed Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka recently. Professional skills are desperately needed as the country "moves into higher economic gear" she declared.

But she speaks with forked tongue.

In some South African economic sectors, the loss of skills is virtually irreparable. The commercial farming sector cannot advertise in the jobs sections of the country's newspapers for a farmer to take over an agricultural property which has succumbed to the ravages of the government's so-called reform policy. Farming is not just a job - it's a calling, it's a way of life, it's specialized, and there's no real job security, no holiday pay, no sick leave or even a decent pension payout. Farmers own their own employment. Thus the rot resulting from the government's farm hand-over policy set in very quickly and obviously.

Other sectors of the economy are now withering due to loss of skills. But while government makes much noise about its efforts to "broaden its skills acquisition programme", it is talking from both sides of its mouth. The facts speak for themselves. A cursory perusal of the employment section of South Africa's newspapers reveals a government chicanery so blatant that it should be exposed for the dishonesty it is.

At the request of the SA Business Times, the research organization DMA announced that more than 70% of all positions advertised in the Business Times Careers section of the newspaper were for government or parastatal jobs. The public sector accounted for 7570 jobs advertised between January and March of this year, compared with the private sector's 3114.

While the government crows about its broad-based skills acquisition programme, little is said about why there are such enormous gaps in the public service sector. The reason is simple. While the government aggressively advertises, virtually every advertisement declares the employer must adhere to the government's employment equity policy.

From universities to parastatals like Eskom, the CSIR and the Human Sciences Research Council, to government departments and municipalities, the message is the same. If you're white, don't bother applying.

A few weeks ago, the Department of Environmental Affairs and Development Planning advertised for a Specialist Town and Regional Planner. The ad declared "the department intends to promote representivity with the filling of the post. Kindly indicate gender, race and disability status to facilitate the process." Significantly, the ad says the post has been advertised before. Clearly there weren't too many takers, given the restrictions.

On the same page, the Saudi International Petrochemical Company advertised for a Business Development Specialist and a Process Engineer. All that interested the employer were the qualifications and suitability of prospective candidates. In another ad, a Saudi food company advertised for a series of highly-specialised jobs where, the ad declared unambiguously, "highly competitive financial packages will be tailored to attract the best talent available". It is significant that these international companies now advertise aggressively in South Africa's newspapers. They realize the stupidity of the SA government's discriminatory policy and they are climbing on the bandwagon.

Some government departments don't waste words. The Department of Home Affairs says in its advertisement that "the promotion of representivity" is its goal and applicants who adhere to this dictum "will receive preference". One must indicate "in this regard to expedite the processing of applications". In other words, don't even waste our time applying if you are white.

One weekly Employment Supplement consisted of 40 pages packed with government, municipal and parastatal jobs. All of them were discriminatory against whites. Week after week, newspapers carry more and more job ads, and week after week they are not filled. Looking at the qualifications needed to meet the requirements of most of the posts, it's no wonder. Given the paucity of skills within South Africa's black sector, the government will continue its jobs merry-go-round until the whole public sector implodes upon itself.

Even that once-proud bastion of Afrikaner excellence, the University of Stellenbosch goes along with the lunacy. It advertised for a Research Manager for its SA Centre for Epidemiological Modelling and Analysis. "The university subscribes to an employment equity plan which acknowledges the urgent need to diversify the demographic composition of the staff corps", it unctuously proclaimed, "especially with regard to the appointment of suitable candidates from the designated groups".

Some mining companies are also on the EE treadmill. Other big companies advertise they are equal employment opportunity employers. It would be safe to say that the major banks in South Africa could not survive without their white customers. Yet one of the biggest banks openly offers, via large colourful advertisements in the press, that shares in its bank are available to black, coloured and Indian small businessmen. Nothing for the whites who keep the bank alive!

Yet the [neighboring country -- Ed] Botswana Bureau of Standards is not so obtuse and ideologically preposterous. It advertises for a Director who is competent for the job. There are no race, gender or other preferences mentioned in the job ad.

No wonder the cream of our people are being poached overseas. And why not? Why bother to apply when your chances of getting the job are virtually nil? Even qualified coloured people [of mixed race -- Ed] are now being sidelined. In a recent landmark court judgement, a coloured engineer who applied for a job and was rejected in place of a black whose qualifications were of a lower standard did not win his case in court after he complained of unfair discrimination. It seems only blacks need apply these days.

The following reply was received by a member of the public who queried the possibility of his son (white) being accepted for a post advertised by an education appointment bureau.

"We are recruiting on behalf of our clients and it is therefore their prerogative as to who they would like to employ but also who they are allowed to employ, according to their employment equity profiles. Preference will be given to previously disadvantaged candidates for the position we've advertised on their behalf."

The government admits there are few skilled people, but continues its charade of advertising jobs which few can fill because of the government's anti-white policy. Farmers were recently called upon to guard a jail in the Limpopo region after inmates ran amok during a strike by warders. There was no emergency staff to fill the breach.

There are nearly 24 000 South African medical professionals working in the developed, English-speaking areas of the world. A national Human Resources report published a week ago revealed that apart from a search for greener pastures, the health professionals "were mainly frustrated and pushed to leave the country".

South Africa's IT performance is slipping. The World Economic Forum Global Information Technology Report for 2005/6 ranked South Africa 90th in a list of 115 countries with regard to the availability of scientists and engineers. There is a huge shortage of air traffic controllers in South Africa. They are being lured overseas, and not enough people are undergoing training to replace them, according to the trade union Solidarity.

It is difficult for young whites to obtain bursaries in South Africa, either government or private. The biggest psychiatric hospital in the country has only one psychiatrist and one psychologist on its staff. There is not one chemist on the staff of the hospital, which situation is in contravention of appropriate legislation.

There is also a shortage of between 1200 and 2000 engineers in South Africa at present. Ninety eight percent of construction companies complain about the shortage, yet they are mostly inveigled into advertising on an employment equity basis.

And so the charade continues. Will sanity prevail in time to prevent complete collapse? This is anyone's guess, but the outlook is not good.

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